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Abstract Prospect theory is the most influential descriptive alternative to the orthodox
model of rational choice under risk and uncertainty, in terms of empirical analyses of
some of its principal parameters and as a consideration in behavioural public policy. Yet
the most distinctive implication of the theory—a fourfold predicted pattern of risk
attitudes called the reflection effect—has been infrequently studied and with mixed
results over money outcomes, and has never been completely tested over health
outcomes. This article reports tests of reflection over money and health outcomes
defined by life years gained from treatment. With open valuation exercises, the results
suggest qualified support for the reflection effect over money outcomes and strong
support over health outcomes. However, in pairwise choice questions, reflection was
substantially ameliorated over life years, remaining significant only for treatments that
offered short additional durations of life.
Keywords Expected utility theory . Fourfold pattern of risk preferences .Markowitz .
Money and health . Prospect theory . Reflection effect . Risk
JEL Classifications B21 . C12 . C91
1 Introduction
Neoclassical economics and the standard theory of rational choice under conditions of
risk and uncertainty (i.e. von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory)—hereon
defined as orthodox theory—postulate that people should adopt a consistent risk
attitude across all decisions that offer outcomes that do not occur with certainty. More
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specifically, it is typically assumed that marginal utility diminishes with increasing
money outcomes, as indicated by curve aa in Fig. 1, and thus that an individual will be
consistently risk averse—although in several articles Matthew Rabin argues that
orthodox theory does not permit risk aversion over anything other than very large
outcomes, and that near universal risk neutrality is the more accurate assumption (e.g.
see Rabin 2000). However, at least some of the founding fathers of neoclassical
economic theory acknowledged that actual choice behaviours regularly reveal incon-
sistent individual risk attitudes across different circumstances. For instance, Alfred
Marshall (1920), in relation to occupational choice, wrote that people will tend to be
risk averse in the face of modest outcomes, but will be risk seeking when a few very
large outcomes are offered, and we know from common observation that many
individuals both gamble and insure.
In 1952, Harry Markowitz presented a more formal challenge to whether the
assumption of a consistent risk attitude holds up in descriptive choice. Markowitz
posed a series of questions that involved choices between a 10% chance of money
gains or losses of $1 to $10,000,000 and the expected values of those lotteries. With
these questions, Markowitz discovered that his acquaintances were typically risk averse
when faced with a 10% chance of large gains and small losses, and risk seeking when
faced with a 10% chance of small gains and large losses. He attributed all of these
attitudes to the size of the outcome and to whether the outcomes were perceived as
gains or losses—i.e. risk aversion over large gains and small losses and risk seeking
over small gains and large losses—with the point dividing gains and losses assumed to
be present or customary wealth. The shape of Markowitz’s utility curve is depicted as
bb in Fig. 1; intimating loss aversion—i.e. the tendency to feel the pain of a loss more
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acutely than the pleasure of an equal sized gain—Markowitz suggested that the curve
falls faster to the left than it rises to the right of the origin.
A generation later, Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1992), in their work on prospect
theory, similarly postulated that utility—or rather, in their words, value—is reference
dependent in that it is defined by gains and losses around a reference point, but more so
than Markowitz, they specified an empirically supported value curve that is much
steeper for losses than for gains, strongly emphasising loss aversion. However, unlike
Markowitz’s utility curve, which has concave and convex regions within both the
positive and negative domains, Kahneman and Tversky’s value function is entirely
concave for gains and convex for losses, giving an S-shaped curve. A typical prospect
theory value curve is depicted as cc in Fig. 1.
The curve cc implies declining marginal sensitivity to both mounting gains and
mounting losses, and hence risk aversion and risk seeking in the domains of gains and
losses, respectively. Therefore, unlike orthodox utility theory but in common with the
Markowitz model, prospect theory, by allowing people to take risks, is incompatible
with the notion that certainty is always desirable. However, prospect theory introduced
a further complication that Markowitz avoided, by also positing that people will
overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities. The
underweighting of large probabilities reinforces the risk attitude predictions inferred
from the value function, but the overweighting of small probabilities may reverse the
risk attitudes in the domains of gains and losses, such that individuals will now be risk
seeking in the former and risk averse in the latter. Thus, probability weighting predicts
gambling and insurance behaviours in small probability scenarios. Due to the combined
effects of the value and probability weighting functions, Tversky and Kahneman (1992,
p.306) note that the Bmost distinctive implication of prospect theory is the fourfold
pattern of risk attitudes.^ These risk attitudes are summarised in Table 1, for which
Tversky and Kahneman, in a non-incentivised study using simple money lotteries,
provided empirical support.
The top left quadrant in Table 1 describes the prospect theory risk attitude prediction
when a person is faced with a large probability of a gain—for example, a 99% chance
of winning £1000. If an individual is offered a choice between this risky option and the
certainty of its expected value of £990, prospect theory predicts that the individual
places a high weight on the certainty and will demonstrate risk aversion. The bottom
left quadrant describes the predicted risk attitude when faced with a small probability of
a gain, such as a 1% chance of £1000. Here, the prediction is that since the individual
will overweight the chance of winning, he or she would prefer the gamble over its
Table 1 Prospect theory’s predicted risk attitudes
Gains Losses
High probability
(The certainty effect)
Fear of missing gain
Risk aversion
Hope to avoid loss
Risk seeking
Low probability
(The possibility effect)
Hope of gain
Risk seeking
Fear of loss
Risk aversion
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expected value of £10 and will therefore be risk seeking. The top and bottom right
quadrants can be read similarly, and show that prospect theory predicts opposing risk
attitudes for losses as compared to gains for both large and small probability scenarios.
This fourfold pattern of predicted risk attitudes is known as prospect theory’s reflection
effect.
2 Evidence of the reflection effect
Prospect theory has received a lot of attention over the past 25 years, both in
terms of the scientific modifications that it makes to standard rational choice
theory and in relation to its possible real-world policy implications (e.g. see
Kahneman 2011; Oliver 2017; Thaler 2015). Controlled testing of the full
reflection effect is relatively scarce, although to supplement this evidence, there
is some partial testing of the reflection effect that focuses on the value function
of prospect theory using money outcomes.
For example, Schoemaker (1990), using mid-range probabilities, found that
his respondents tended towards risk aversion over gains and slight risk seeking
over losses in a within-respondent design. Moreover, he observed that the
results held for both hypothetical and incentivised choices. Similarly, Laury
and Holt (2005) reported risk aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses
for low hypothetical outcomes, although the modal pattern switched to risk
aversion over gains and losses for high hypothetical outcomes and in circum-
stances where money could be won. Abdellaoui et al. (2007), using binary
choice questions, observed substantial risk aversion over gains and risk seeking
over losses at the individual level and, in particular, the aggregate level. Booij
et al. (2010), using hypothetical questions, reported mild risk aversion over
gains and mild risk seeking over losses, a result that was replicated in a study
by Abdellaoui et al. (2013) that used financial professionals as respondents.
Baucells and Villasis (2010) revisited the individual level results reported in
Schoemaker (1990), Laury and Holt (2005) and Abdellaoui (2000; 2007) for
choices that used mid-level probabilities and found that, overall, 47% of
respondents demonstrated risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses.
Baucells and Villasis argued that this does not provide overwhelming support
for the reflection effect, and in their own original study they likewise found
that just below 50% of their respondents were risk averse over gains and risk
seeking over losses.
The evidence on twofold reflection—risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for
losses—over money outcomes is therefore a little mixed; the evidence on the full
fourfold prospect theory predicted pattern of risk attitudes is even more so. Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) provided between-respondent support for the full reflection effect
in hypothetical choices, but Hershey and Schoemaker (1980) observed statistically
significant consistency with the effect in only 7 of 25 gamble pairs. Moreover, neither
Cohen et al. (1987) in an incentivised within-respondent design nor Wehrung (1989) in
a non-incentivised within-respondent design observed a pervasive prospect theory
reflection effect. Likewise, Harbaugh et al. (2002), using real, simple lotteries, found
that respondents did not answer consistently with the fourfold pattern, a result
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replicated by Harbaugh et al. (2009) when eliciting incentivised responses in pairwise
choice, but not when using pricing tasks,1 where a strong predicted fourfold risk
preference pattern was observed. Similarly, using real incentives, both di Mauro and
Maffioletti (2004) and Brooks et al. (2014) confirmed the prospect theory fourfold
pattern of risk preferences.
Moreover, in a recent article, Bouchouicha and Vieider (2017) reported results from
an incentivised study over gains only and from a non-incentivised study over gains and
losses. In order to elicit the certainty equivalent of each money gamble in their studies
they presented their respondents with a series of pairwise choices between the gamble
in question and a number of sure amounts. The gambles were varied in probabilities
and outcome magnitudes. Bouchouicha and Vieider observed that for each outcome
level, risk aversion increased with the probabilities over gains in both studies, and risk
seeking increased with the probabilities over losses in the non-incentivised study. Taken
together, these results are consistent with prospect theory’s fourfold reflection effect.
Thus far, though, the money outcome literature does not allow a clear-cut conclusion
to be reached regarding the validity of the prospect theory reflection effect, which sits a
little uncomfortably, given the attention that the theory has received in the academic
and policy discourses. Moreover, prospect theory has attracted interest not just in policy
areas that are concerned principally with money outcomes. Health-related preference
elicitation instruments are based on the assumption that people are economically
rational, in the sense implied by the orthodox theory of choice under risk and uncer-
tainty, despite evidence to the contrary, and prospect theory has occasionally been
drawn into these considerations. Loss aversion is likely to be at least a partial expla-
nation for discrepancies observed between answers to willingness to pay and willing-
ness to accept exercises (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1990), and between different versions of
the time trade-off method (e.g. Attema and Brouwer 2008; Oliver and Wolff 2014), for
instance. Also, Oliver (2003), inspired by work from Bleichrodt et al. (2001), reported
that the internal consistency of the standard gamble, with outcomes defined by
longevity, could be improved by adjusting the instrument with some of the modifica-
tions that prospect theory makes to standard rational choice theory (see also, van Osch
et al. 2004, 2006), and Abellan-Perpiñan et al. (2009) observed that compared to
evaluations based on expected utility theory, those based on prospect theory are more
consistent with respondents’ direct choices and rankings of different health profiles.
Moreover, if we move beyond the specific domain of health outcomes measurements to
a focus on incentivising healthier behaviours and developing behavioural economic-
informed policy frameworks, for example, we can discover that considerations of
aspects of prospect theory have been increasingly evident in the broader health policy
debate over recent years (e.g. see Behavioural Insights Team 2010; Oliver 2017). Yet
over health outcomes, although there is incidental evidence that people tend to be risk
averse over gains and risk seeking over losses in some of the classic studies on framing
(e.g. McNeil et al. 1982), and although there has been some limited testing over mid-
range probabilities of twofold reflection—e.g. Attema et al. (2013, 2016) observed risk
1 A pairwise or binary choice task will, for instance, offer a respondent a direct choice between a lottery and its
expected value (e.g. would you choose a 50% chance of £10 or £5 for sure). A pricing task will elicit the
respondent’s certainty equivalent (or approximate certainty equivalent) of the lottery through open valuation
(e.g. what is the maximum amount of money you would pay for a 50% chance of £10). A sequence of
pairwise choice tasks can also be used to elicit a respondent’s certainty equivalent.
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aversion over both gains and losses for life years—there has not been any direct testing
of the fourfold reflection effect at all.
This article aims to address this gap in the literature to some extent, by testing for the
fourfold reflection effect—the most distinctive implication of the most influential
alternative to the orthodox theory of rational choice under risk and uncertainty—in
hypothetical health-related scenarios. However, to later compare the extent of the
reflection effect between the importantly different contexts of health and financial
outcomes, two original studies of the reflection effect over money outcomes will first
be reported. The first of these studies on financial outcomes, which builds on previous
work by Guthrie (2003), uses a single outcome magnitude of £20,000 and is restricted
to tests with only high and low probabilities; in order to test the generalisability of the
reflection effect, the second study extends the tests to also include the very large
outcome magnitude of £1million and the smaller outcome magnitude of £100, as well
as the intermediate outcome magnitude of £10,000, and uses the full range of the
probability distribution.
Although necessarily abstract, an attempt is made to lend an element of realism to all
of the tests reported below, by taking the questions beyond the presentation of simple
abstract lotteries that is standard practice in the existing literature. The risk attitude
predictions of orthodox rational choice theory and prospect theory for gains and losses
at the ends of the probability distribution are summarised in Table 2. Since the
Markowitz model has also attracted some attention in the recent literature (e.g.
Bouchouicha and Vieider 2017; Levy and Levy 2002; Scholten and Read 2014), its
risk attitude predictions for small to sizable but not huge outcomes are also presented in
the table, and will be referred to below.
3 Testing reflection with litigation questions
The orthodox model of rational choice under risk and uncertainty is typically assumed
in the economic theory of suit and settlement, with litigants posited as rational actors
who make risk neutral or risk averse choices to maximise their outcomes (Guthrie
2003). However, since plaintiffs and defendants operate in the domains of gains and
losses, respectively, Guthrie hypothesised that prospect theory will better describe their
choices. Where plaintiffs have a low probability of winning, he posited that they will
retain the hope that the court will find in their favour, and will consequently be risk
seeking. Defendants, on the other hand, will be unwilling to risk a larger loss and will
Table 2 Risk attitude predictions
Orthodox PT Markowitz
High probability of gain Risk averse Risk averse Risk seeking
Low probability of gain Risk averse Risk seeking Risk seeking
High probability of loss Risk averse Risk seeking Risk averse
Low probability of loss Risk averse Risk averse Risk averse
Note: PT = prospect theory
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therefore be risk averse. The settlement will favour plaintiffs in these circumstances.
Where there is a high probability that the plaintiff will win, Guthrie suggested that the
risk attitudes of the two parties will reverse, favouring the defendants.
To illustrate, Guthrie presented law students with hypothetical low probability
litigation questions, and asked half of his respondents to assume the role of plaintiff
and the other half the role of defendant. Plaintiffs were told that they had to choose
between a $50 payment settlement or face a 1% chance of winning $5000 at trial;
defendants had to choose between paying $50 or face a 1% chance of having to pay
$5000 at trial. Under orthodox rational choice theory, risk aversion—and thus a
tendency to settle—is expected from both plaintiffs and defendants. Guthrie reported
that 84% of the defendants but only 38% of the plaintiffs preferred to settle, offering
some support for prospect theory.
In order to test the full fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, Guthrie’s study is extended
here to consider high as well as low probabilities that the plaintiff will win if the case
relies on the court. The respondents were 60 postgraduate students, 38 of whom were
female. Forty-nine were age 18–30 years, eight were 31–45 years, two were 46–
60 years and one was older than 60 years. Forty-eight had studied economics and 30
stated that they like taking risks. Each respondent attended a face-to-face interview that
lasted 30–45 minutes, where they answered two sets of four questions. Given the
relatively small sample size, a within-respondent design was used. It may be contended
that with a within-respondent design there is a danger that respondents will adopt a
convenient rule of either gambling or not gambling across all questions, which does not
reflect their underlying preferences but which helps them to get through what may for
many be a boring task. If so, we might see artificially high consistencies in individual
risk attitudes. The counterargument is that one can conclude that any observed system-
atic inconsistency with the orthodox theory of rational choice is likely to be particularly
robust if a within-respondent design is used (Hershey and Schoemaker 1980). Within
each set of questions, the question order was randomised across the respondents. The
questions in one of the sets are replicated in Fig. 2.
Questions 1 and 3 in the figure asked the respondents to assume that they are
plaintiffs in civil law suits where they were respectively facing high and low probabil-
ities that the court would find in their favour.2 A 90% chance of success was chosen for
the high probability scenario because this was considered high enough for probability
transformation to apply, and yet low enough so that respondents would not round up
the chance to certainty. Following similar reasoning, a 10% chance of success was
chosen for the low probability scenario, although in this question the intention was of
course to discourage the respondents from rounding the chance down to 0%. The
outcome of the litigation was set at a maximum/minimum of ± £20,000, substantial and
imaginable but not life-changing amounts for postgraduate students. The respondents
were told that they should not worry about legal fees, which would be covered
extraneously whether they won or lost. Questions 2 and 4 in the figure required the
respondents to assume the position of the opposing defendants.
2 In this and all of the other studies reported in this article, the decision tasks used were explained thoroughly
to the respondents at the beginning of their interviews. At the same time, respondents engaged in warm up
exercises and could ask questions of the interviewer. This was to attempt to ensure that the respondents fully
understood what was being asked of them; in all studies, at the end of the warm up periods, all respondents
appeared to understand the tasks.
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In common with Schoemaker (1990) and Harbaugh et al. (2009), the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method was used to elicit the respondents’ answers
(Becker et al. 1964). For example, to approximate their certainty equivalents for the
risky option of going to trial in question 1, the respondents were prompted to state the
minimum amount on which they would settle, say, £x. Once they had decided upon £x,
a number between £0–20,000 was generated by a random device. If the random
number was equal to or greater than £x, the respondent would settle. If the random
number was less than £x, the respondent would be required to go to trial. The BDM
method was used to remove, at least in theory, the incentives for respondents to
overstate or understate the amounts that they would require/offer when placed in the
position of a plaintiff or defendant, respectively.
The literature contests whether real financial rewards can affect the results of
laboratory studies. Beattie and Loomes (1997) and Bardsley et al. (2010) report that
financial incentives are often not important. Camerer and Hogarth (1999) find that the
effect of financial incentives varies across decision tasks, and Hertwig and Ortmann
Question 1: Imagine that you are a plaintiff in a civil law suit. You have made a claim for 
£20,000 for damages. According to expert advice, you have a 90% chance of winning. 
That is, you have a 90% chance of getting £20,000 and a 10% chance of getting nothing. 
You won’t know the result until the jury returns. 
Rather than relying on the jury, you have indicated to the defendant that you might be 
willing to accept a settlement. What is the minimum amount of money you would require 
the defendant to pay you in order to avoid the jury’s decision? 
Question 2: Imagine that you are a defendant in a civil law suit. A claim has been made 
against you for £20,000 for damages. According to expert advice, you have a 90% chance 
of having to pay. That is, you have a 90% chance of losing £20,000 and a 10% chance of 
losing nothing. You won’t know the result until the jury returns. 
Rather than relying on the jury, the plaintiff has indicated that he might be willing to 
accept a settlement. What is the maximum amount of money you would be willing to pay 
in order to avoid relying on the jury’s decision?
Question 3: Imagine that you are a plaintiff in a civil law suit. You have made a claim for 
£20,000 for damages. According to expert advice, you have a 10% chance of winning. 
That is, you have a 10% chance of getting £20,000 and a 90% chance of getting nothing. 
You won’t know the result until the jury returns. 
Rather than relying on the jury, you have indicated to the defendant that you might be 
willing to accept a settlement. What is the minimum amount of money you would require 
the defendant to pay you in order to avoid the jury’s decision? 
Question 4: Imagine that you are a defendant in a civil law suit. A claim has been made 
against you for £20,000 for damages. According to expert advice, you have a 10% chance 
of having to pay. That is, you have a 10% chance of losing £20,000 and a 90% chance of 
losing nothing. You won’t know the result until the jury returns. 
Rather than relying on the jury, the plaintiff has indicated that he might be willing to 
accept a settlement. What is the maximum amount of money you would be willing to pay 
in order to avoid relying on the jury’s decision?
Fig. 2 The litigation questions
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(2001) point out that such incentives can sometimes have an influence. Financial
incentives were included in this litigation study in that the money the respondents
received for their participation was consequent on the answers that they gave. The
outcomes to the plaintiff questions were divided by 10,000 to determine the actual
money rewards for each question, but the respondents were not informed of this until
they had answered all of the questions.3
In one of the sets of four questions, the respondents were asked to assume that they
have zero money holdings and that they should approach each question as if this were the
case. At the top right hand corner of each question, £0 was typed (in bold) and the
respondents were informed at the beginning of the experiment that this was to remind
them that they had zero money holdings as they answered the questions. In the other set of
four questions, the same respondents were asked to assume that they havemoney holdings
of £100,000 as they addressed each question, and £100,000was typed (in bold) at the top
right hand corner of each question. In all other respects, the questions and the way in
which they were administered were identical across the two sets. Half of the respondents
answered the questions assuming zero money holdings first, and the other half answered
the questions assuming £100,000 money holdings first. The reason for the two different
levels of customary wealth was to test whether a manipulation of this factor affected the
results. As detailed below, it did not notably, which lends some support to the argument
that, over money outcomes, customary wealth is widely accepted as the reference point.
Table 3 summarises the results, first for the questions where the respondents were asked
to assume zero money holdings and then money holdings of £100,000. Only those
respondents who demonstrated strict risk aversion or strict risk seeking across both
questions in each of the four tests are included in the analysis. For example, the first row
of Table 3 indicates that 38 of the 60 respondents demonstrated either risk aversion or risk
seeking when faced with a 90% chance of winning £20,000, and a 90% chance of losing
£20,000. Thus, 22 respondents demonstrated risk neutrality in at least one of these two
questions. Whenever respondents demonstrated risk neutrality in any particular question it
is difficult to observe the extent to which they concur (or not) with the reflection effect
except where respondents are universally risk neutral, which occurred only once.
In the table, SS denotes risk seeking in the domains of both gains and losses, SA denotes
risk seeking over gains but risk aversion over losses, AS denotes risk aversion over gains but
risk seeking over losses, and AA denotes risk aversion over both gains and losses. The first
row in the table demonstrates the extent to which the respondents reversed their risk attitudes
when facedwith a 90% chance of gaining versus losing £20,000, when their money holdings
were zero. Thus, 11% of the respondents were risk seeking in the domains of both gains and
losses when faced with high probabilities, a pattern unpredicted by any of the theories
considered in this article but one that does at least suggest stable risk attitudes, in common
with the orthodox model. Risk seeking over gains and risk aversion over losses here is
3 It can be contested that in order to financially incentivise the respondents they ought to have been informed
that the outcomes would be scaled down before they answered the questions. However, had this been done, the
respondents may well have processed the questions as if they all had small financial consequences. It was felt
that by not knowing the exact scaling down of the money outcomes at the beginning of the study the
respondents would mentally process the outcomes as given, and this is what they appeared to be doing during
the warm up session. Moreover, by informing the respondents up front that their payments would be
consequent on their answers (which was the case, and thus no deception was involved), the respondents
would feel in some sense financially incentivised.
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predicted by the Markowitz model, but is demonstrated by only 3% of the respondents, the
same percentage who responded consistently with the orthodox model. The dominant
pattern—risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses—is that predicted by prospect
theory. The extent to which this particular pattern of reflection is systematic—i.e. the extent to
which AS patterns outnumber SA patterns—is statistically significant at 0.1%.
All of the other rows in the table can be read similarly. Prospect theory and the
Markowitz model predict the same pattern of reflection—SA—for the low probability
gambles in these tests, and as with pattern AS for the high probability gambles, although
slightly less marked, this is the systematic, statistically significant pattern observed at less
than 1% significance. Taking all of the questions together, in terms of the fourfold pattern
of risk attitudes over high and low probabilities of gains and losses, there is therefore
strong support for the prospect theory reflection effect in these results.4,5 However, the
study is small, and, as noted at the end of Section 2, uses only two probabilities and a
single outcome magnitude. A second study was undertaken to observe whether these
conclusions held across a range of probabilities attached to varying outcomes.
4 If £20,000 was instead assumed to be a life-changing amount of money for the respondents, the Markowitz
model would predict a risk preference pattern of AS throughout Table 3, as opposed to that of SA postulated in
Table 2. Either way, the overall data better match the prospect theory than the Markowitz predictions.
5 The results in Table 3 and the analysis that follows it are based upon the proportion of respondents exhibiting
each particular risk preference pattern over gains and losses. A much stricter test would look at the proportion
of respondents who complied with all four risk attitudes in each test of reflection, as predicted by each theory.
When assuming zero money holdings, 28 respondents demonstrated either a risk averse or risk seeking attitude
in all four questions; for the reason noted above, those respondents who demonstrated risk neutrality were
excluded from the analysis, except the one respondent who was universally risk neutral and was thus
consistent with the orthodox model. Under these circumstances, 7% of the respondents were consistent with
the orthodox model, 31%with prospect theory, 0% with Markowitz under the assumption that £20,000 is not a
life-changing amount of money, and 10% with Markowitz under the assumption that it is a life-changing
amount of money. The remaining respondents demonstrated one of all remaining fourfold risk preference
patterns. When assuming money holdings of £100,000, 26 respondents could be tested similarly: 4% were
consistent with the orthodox model, 58% with prospect theory, 0% with Markowitz under the assumption that
£20,000 is not a life-changing amount of money, and 4% with Markowitz under the assumption that it is a life-
changing amount of money.
Table 3 Litigation results
N SS SA AS AA SA vs AS
Zero holdings
q.1 and q.2 (±£20,000, 0.9) 38 11% 3% 84% 3% p < 0.001
q.3 and q.4 (±£20,000, 0.1) 38 34% 47% 13% 5% p < 0.01
£100,000 holdings
q.1 and q.2 (±£20,000, 0.9) 32 9% 6% 81% 3% p < 0.001
q.3 and q.4 (±£20,000, 0.1) 37 30% 59% 5% 5% p < 0.001
SS denotes risk seeking in the domains of both gains and losses; SA denotes risk seeking over gains but risk
aversion over losses; AS denotes risk aversion over gains but risk seeking over losses; and AA denotes risk
aversion over both gains and losses. The χ2 statistic was used in all tests of significance in this article and 5%
is taken as the threshold of significance
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4 Testing reflection with investment questions
Sixty postgraduates and university research and administrative staff participated in the
second test of prospect theory’s fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, none of whom had
answered the litigation questions. Forty-five of the respondents were female. Forty-four
were age 18–30 years, 13 were 31–45 years, one was 46–60 years and two were older
than 60 years. Forty-four had studied economics, and 32 stated that they generally like
taking risks. Each respondent attended a face-to-face interview that lasted between 45
and 75 minutes, during which they were required to answer the 30 questions reported
here. The questions were described as quasi-realistic investment decisions, and their
order was randomised across the respondents in a within-respondent design. Two of the
questions are replicated in Fig. 3.
The first question in the figure involves a large chance of a sizeable gain,
and the second question presents the same chance of an equivalently sized loss.
The BDM method was again used to elicit the respondents’ near certainty
equivalents for the investments. The respondents were faced with investments
that offered 90%, 70%, 50%, 30% and 10% chances of gaining and losing
£1million, £10,000 and £100. Before answering the questions, the respondents
were told that their answers would determine their winnings. After completing
the questions, the respondents were informed that payments would be normal-
ised so that a maximum of £1 could be earned from each question. The results
are summarised in Table 4, which can be read in a similar manner as Table 3.
Again, any respondent who demonstrated risk neutrality in a question pair is
excluded.
As in the litigation study, the risk preference pattern AS dominates all cases
of reflection in the high probability gambles, which is particularly marked in
the investment questions for the large outcomes of $1million. For such large
outcomes, the Markowitz model also predicts AS patterns across all probabil-
ities, but predicts SA patterns for moderate and small outcomes. Since AS is
the modal pattern across all outcome sizes when high probabilities are used, the
results in this respect point towards prospect theory reflection.
However, there is not strong support for the prospect theory prediction of SA
being the systematic pattern of reflection over small probability outcomes,
except for the relatively small outcome magnitude of $100. Although, in line
with prospect theory, the overall trend across all outcome sizes is generally one
Question 1: You inherited an investment and there is a 90% chance that you could gain 
£10,000, with a 10% chance of gaining or losing nothing. You can, if you wish, sell this 
investment. What is the minimum amount of money for which you would be prepared to 
sell the investment?
Question 2: You inherited an investment and there is a 90% chance that you could lose
£10,000, with a 10% chance of losing or gaining nothing. You can cancel this investment, 
but you will have to pay a penalty in order to do so. What is the maximum amount of 
money that you would be prepared to pay to cancel the investment? 
Fig. 3 The investment questions
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of declining AS patterns and increasing SA patterns as probability diminishes,
for moderate and large outcomes the differences in the number of respondents
demonstrating these patterns suggest that for low probabilities, reflection cannot
be attributed to anything more than random noise.
The orthodox prediction of universal risk aversion is rarely observed in these
results. Where consistency in risk attitude is observed, it is in most cases more
likely when respondents showed themselves to be risk seeking over both gains
and losses. This pattern becomes more evident as outcome size declines, and
can be attributed to more respondents demonstrating SS patterns at the expense
of AS patterns. In other words, with smaller outcomes more respondents were
willing to throw caution to the wind in the gains domain, which, in and of
itself, is a phenomenon that was predicted by Markowitz and was also observed
by Bouchouicha and Vieider (2017).6 Although Markowitz overlooked the
possible effect of subjective probability on observations of reflection, which
prevented him from seeing the full descriptive picture of risk-related decision
6 Bouchouicha and Vieider (2017) similarly did not observe the Markowitz prediction of risk seeking
increasing with the magnitude of losses.
Table 4 Investment results
N SS SA AS AA SA vs AS
q.1 & 2 (±£1million, 0.9) 49 2% 0% 92% 6% p < 0.001
q.3 & 4 (±£1million, 0.7) 42 24% 12% 60% 5% p < 0.001
q.5 & 6 (±£1million, 0.5) 36 22% 19% 44% 14% Not significant
q.7 & 8 (±£1million, 0.3) 38 21% 13% 45% 21% p < 0.02
q.9 & 10 (±£1million, 0.1) 38 21% 26% 37% 16% Not significant
q.11 & 12 (±£10,000, 0.9) 29 34% 0% 62% 3% p < 0.001
q.13 & 14 (±£10,000, 0.7) 44 27% 9% 59% 5% p < 0.001
q.15 & 16 (±£10,000, 0.5) 34 41% 9% 35% 15% p < 0.025
q.17 & 18 (±£10,000, 0.3) 41 27% 27% 24% 22% Not significant
q.19 & 20 (±£10,000, 0.1) 26 35% 35% 23% 8% Not significant
q.21 & 22 (±£100, 0.9) 33 42% 0% 58% 0% p < 0.001
q.23 & 24 (±£100, 0.7) 42 52% 2% 43% 2% p < 0.001
q.25 & 26 (±£100, 0.5) 30 53% 13% 30% 3% Not significant
q.27 & 28 (±£100, 0.3) 36 42% 22% 28% 8% Not significant
q.29 & 30 (±£100, 0.1) 39 41% 46% 3% 10% p < 0.001
SS denotes risk seeking in the domains of both gains and losses; SA denotes risk seeking over gains but risk
aversion over losses; AS denotes risk aversion over gains but risk seeking over losses; and AA denotes risk
aversion over both gains and losses
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making, his recognition that different magnitudes of outcome can flip risk
attitudes in the domain of gains was somewhat perceptive.7,8
Overall, the results from the investment questions, like those previously
reported in the literature on the reflection effect, are a little mixed, but taking
the litigation and investment studies together there is guarded support for the
fourfold prospect theory reflection effect in these tests, particularly over rela-
tively smaller outcomes.9 This is for money outcomes; as noted earlier, fourfold
reflection has yet to be studied over a different outcome domain of public policy—that
of health outcomes—which seems remiss given that prospect theory has attracted
substantial attention in the recent health policy literature.
5 Testing reflection with health-related questions
Sixty postgraduates and university research and administrative staff, who had not
participated in the first two studies reported above, answered 30 hypothetical health
care-related questions. Forty-five of the respondents were female. Forty-seven were age
18–30 years and 13 were 31–45 years. Forty-four had studied economics, and 32 stated
that they generally like taking risks. The respondents were of a mix of different
nationalities. Each respondent once again attended a face-to-face interview to answer
the questions. The order of the questions was randomised across the respondents, and
two of the questions are replicated in Fig. 4.
Question 1 in Fig. 4 was designed with the intention that the respondents would
believe that they are being offered a large chance of a small gain, in terms of
additional months of life that they could live, and were prompted for their
approximate certainty equivalent of the risky treatment option. They were told
7 However, the results do not offer support for the full Markowitz predicted pattern of reflection across gains
and losses. According to theMarkowitz model, for each level of probability in Table 4 the general trend should
be an increasing proportion of AS patterns and a decreasing proportion of SA patterns as outcome size
increases. While the proportion of AS patterns does increase somewhat, a decline in the proportion of SA
patterns is not generally observed, principally because the prevalence of this pattern is not particularly evident
at any outcome level, other than when attached to the lowest probability in the table, as predicted by prospect
theory. Evidence in support of Markowitz reflection is even less evident in the health outcome studies reported
later in this article. Moreover, over health outcomes, unlike with money outcomes, there was no general trend
of increased risk seeking over smaller outcomes in the domain of gains.
8 The results using the stricter test of the proportion of respondents who complied with all four risk attitudes as
predicted by each theory are hereby presented for the questions where the outcomes had either a very high or a
very low percentage chance of occurring (i.e. 90% or 10%), because it is at these percentage chances that the
full fourfold prospect theory reflection effect is most meant to apply. With an outcome magnitude of £1million,
33 respondents could be tested: 9% of these were fully consistent with the orthodox model, 9% with prospect
theory, 3% with Markowitz under the assumption that £1million is not a life-changing amount of money, and
18% with Markowitz under the assumption that it is a life-changing amount of money. With an outcome
magnitude of £10,000, 21 respondents could be tested: 5% of these were consistent with the orthodox model,
10% with prospect theory, 0% with Markowitz under the assumption that £10,000 is not a life-changing
amount of money, and 24% with Markowitz under the assumption that it is a life-changing amount of money.
Finally, with an outcome magnitude of £100, 25 respondents could be tested: 0% of these were consistent with
the orthodox model, 32% with prospect theory, and 0% with Markowitz whether or not £100 is assumed to be
a life-changing amount of money.
9 If one were to focus upon twofold reflection of risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses over
probabilities between 0.7 and 0.9, however, then this second study, irrespective of outcome magnitude,
strongly corroborates the previous literature that has reported such an effect.
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that they should assume that, for all questions, additional longevity would be
experienced in full health, so as to simplify an already complicated task. More-
over, months rather than years of life were chosen throughout, to discourage the
respondents from rounding their answers to a nearest year, and thus in the hope
that this would cause them to fine-tune their answers. Question 2 is the loss-
framed analogue of Question 1. The respondents were prompted to push them-
selves down to the minimum number of months that they would require, and the
maximum number of months that they would forgo, in the gain and loss framed
questions, respectively, so as to approximate their certainty equivalents as closely
as possible. The respondents were faced with questions that involved health care
treatments offering 90%, 70%, 50%, 30% and 10% chances of intended perceived
gains and losses of 36 months, 180 months and 480 months of life.10 The
respondents were paid a flat fee of £10 for their participation. The results are
summarised in Table 5.11
10 To reiterate from footnote 2, these decision tasks were explained in detail to all respondents at the beginning
of their interviews, where they engaged in warm up exercises. Great care was taken to ensure that all
respondents fully understood what was being asked of them, which by the time they embarked on the main
questions, they all appeared to do.
11 Even over money outcomes, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) discussed the possibility that there may be
special circumstances where the prospect theory value function is convex for gains and concave for losses. For
instance, they wrote that if an individual needs $60,000 to purchase a house, the value function may show a
steep rise near the critical value (there are parallels here with the views expressed by Marshall (1920), noted in
the first paragraph of this article). One could contend that the studies reported in this article, and perhaps
particularly this health-related test, used outcomes that sometimes have extreme possible consequences that
may plausibly fall within Kahneman and Tversky’s special circumstances category. The results imply,
however, that the chosen outcomes in and of themselves did not generally negate evidence for the prospect
theory reflection effect (other than perhaps more people being risk averse when faced with a small probability
of winning a very large money amount than the prospect theory reflection effect would predict in the
investment questions); indeed, in this valuation-based health-related test, the evidence for the reflection effect
was particularly strong.
Question 1: You have an illness which will kill you within the next few days unless you 
take a treatment. Two treatments are available to you. If you take treatment A, there is a 
90% chance that you will live for 36 more months and then die, and a 10% chance that 
the treatment will not work and you will die within the next few days. Alternatively, 
treatment B offers a number of months of life for certain, but we do not know how many 
months that is. 
What is the minimum number of months you would require from treatment B in order for 
you to just prefer to take B over A?
Question 2: You are someone who would normally expect 36 more months of life. 
Unfortunately, your situation is not normal, and you need to take a health care treatment. 
Without treatment, you are certain to lose all 36 months. With treatment A, you still face 
a 90% chance of losing the 36 months, but have a 10% chance of maintaining your 
normal life expectancy. Your doctor has offered you alternative treatment B where you 
are certain to lose a number of months from your normal life expectancy. 
How many months of your normal life expectancy are you willing to forgo in order to be 
tempted to take B over A?
Fig. 4 The health care questions – valuation tasks
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The results strongly support the prospect theory reflection effect. Irrespective of
outcome size, the risk preference patterns predicted by prospect theory are the modal
observation in almost all cases; they are systematically and statistically significantly in
the direction of risk aversion over gains and risk seeking over losses for high proba-
bility gambles, and risk seeking over gains and risk aversion over losses for low
probability gambles.12 On the basis of the results reported in this article, therefore,
the prospect theory fourfold pattern of reflection has the potential to be more pervasive
over health outcomes defined by longevity than those defined by money when using
open valuation tasks, perhaps because considerations pertaining to health are associated
with stronger emotions, and thus provoke to a greater extent the feelings of hope and
12 As with the investment tests reported earlier, the results using the stricter test of the proportion of
respondents who complied with all four risk attitudes as predicted by each theory are hereby presented for
the questions where the outcomes had 90% and 10% chances of occurring. With an outcome magnitude of
480 months, 47 respondents could be tested: 2% of these were fully consistent with the orthodox model and
36%were consistent with prospect theory. If plus and minus 480 months does not take us far from the origin in
Fig. 1, 0% of these respondents were consistent with the Markowitz model; if this number of months takes us
far from the origin, 4% of these respondents were consistent with the Markowitz model. With an outcome
magnitude of 180 months, 51 respondents could be tested: 10% of these were consistent with the orthodox
model and 41% were consistent with prospect theory. If plus and minus 180 months does not take us far from
the origin in Fig. 1, 0% of these respondents were consistent with Markowitz; if this number of months takes
us far from the origin, 6% of the respondents were consistent with Markowitz. With an outcome magnitude of
36 months, 54 respondents could be tested: 6% of these were consistent with the orthodox model and 59%
were consistent with prospect theory. None of these respondents were consistent with the Markowitz
predictions, irrespective of whether or not plus and minus 36 months takes us far from the origin in Fig. 1.
Table 5 Health care results – valuation tasks
N SS SA AS AA SA vs AS
q.1 & 2 (±480mths, 0.9) 54 37% 4% 56% 4% p < 0.001
q.3 & 4 (±480mths, 0.7) 59 37% 7% 31% 25% p < 0.005
q.5 & 6 (±480mths, 0.5) 41 27% 10% 12% 51% Not significant
q.7 & 8 (±480mths, 0.3) 57 33% 18% 21% 28% Not significant
q.9 & 10 (±480mths, 0.1) 52 25% 42% 8% 25% p < 0.001
q.11 & 12 (±180mths, 0.9) 56 23% 0% 61% 16% p < 0.001
q.13 & 14 (±180mths, 0.7) 57 25% 4% 58% 14% p < 0.001
q.15 & 16 (±180mths, 0.5) 43 28% 7% 16% 49% Not significant
q.17 & 18 (±180mths, 0.3) 57 26% 44% 4% 26% p < 0.001
q.19 & 20 (±180mths, 0.1) 53 25% 51% 8% 17% p < 0.001
q.21 & 22 (±36mths, 0.9) 58 19% 0% 76% 5% p < 0.001
q.23 & 24 (±36mths, 0.7) 59 27% 0% 51% 22% p < 0.001
q.25 & 26 (±36mths, 0.5) 40 20% 25% 23% 33% Not significant
q.27 & 28 (±36mths, 0.3) 59 27% 34% 8% 31% p < 0.005
q.29 & 30 (±36mths, 0.1) 54 20% 65% 2% 13% p < 0.001
SS denotes risk seeking in the domains of both gains and losses; SA denotes risk seeking over gains but risk
aversion over losses; AS denotes risk aversion over gains but risk seeking over losses; and AA denotes risk
aversion over both gains and losses
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fear, referred to in Table 1. If this result were generalisable, the tendency for patients—
or their doctors—to accept risk when faced with losses may be particularly
worrisome.13
As noted in the introduction, in one of the relatively few tests of the fourfold
reflection effect over money outcomes, Harbaugh et al. (2009) reported that while they
observed the full effect in valuation tasks of the type used throughout this article, the
effect was eliminated entirely in pairwise choice tasks, where respondents were asked
to choose explicitly between gambles and their expected values.14 Some of those who
have tested the twofold pattern of reflection preferred to use pairwise choice tasks as
this has been observed to produce fewer inconsistencies than eliciting indifference
values (e.g. see Abdellaoui et al. 2007; Booij et al. 2010; Luce 2000); indeed, when
using pairwise choices to elicit certainty equivalents over life years, Attema et al.
(2013) observed risk aversion over both gains and losses. Given this, the fourfold effect
was here also tested with pairwise choices.
The respondents were the same as those summarised above. They answered
30 randomised pairwise choice questions that mirrored the valuation questions,
and were paid a further £10 for their participation. The valuation questions and
the pairwise choice questions took place a few weeks apart; half of the respon-
dents answered the pairwise choice questions first, and the other half first
answered the valuation questions. The pairwise choice questions that correspond
to those given in Fig. 4 are reported in Fig. 5, and the results of the study are
summarised in Table 6.
13 That said, if the status quo is an unbearable proposition to the patient, then the desire to undertake a one-shot
treatment may be rational in a broad sense of the term irrespective of how many orders of magnitude worse
than the status quo is the outcome of treatment failure (assuming that it is possible to have outcomes that are
orders of magnitude worse than ‘unbearable’), given that treatment offers at least some prospect of escaping
the already unbearable status quo.
14 Remember, however, that Bouchouicha and Vieider (2017) used a sequence of pairwise choices to elicit
certainty equivalencies, and found evidence in support of prospect theory’s fourfold reflection effect.
Question 1: You have an illness which will kill you within the next few days unless you 
take a treatment. Two treatments are available to you. If you take treatment A, there is a 
90% chance that you will live for 36 more months and then die, and a 10% chance that 
the treatment will not work and you will die within the next few days. Alternatively, 
treatment B offers 32.4 months for certain. 
Would you choose B over A?
Question 2: You are someone who would normally expect 36 more months of life. 
Unfortunately, your situation is not normal, and you need to take a health care treatment. 
Without treatment, you are certain to lose all 36 months. With treatment A, you still face 
a 90% chance of losing the 36 months, but have a 10% chance of maintaining your 
normal life expectancy. Your doctor has offered you alternative treatment B where you 
are certain to lose 32.4 months from your normal life expectancy. 
Would you choose B over A?
Fig. 5 The health care questions – pairwise choice tasks
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From Table 6, it can readily be seen that compared to the valuation tasks,
evidence for the prospect theory fourfold pattern of risk preferences, although
not entirely absent, has been substantially diminished in pairwise choice. The
pattern remains prominent only for the smallest longevity outcome of
36 months,15 suggesting that the affective responses that may cause the reflection
effect are perhaps most provoked when people are trying to secure a little
additional life. Moreover, this finding has parallels with the study of investment
decisions, where it was found that the full fourfold pattern is most evident over
small money outcomes.16
15 The difference in the number of SA to AS patterns where significance is reached for the medium and large
outcomes is in the opposite direction to that predicted by prospect theory.
16 The results for pairwise choice that correspond to those presented in footnote 12 for the valuation questions
in the stricter test of each theory are hereby presented. In all cases all 60 respondents could be tested. With an
outcome magnitude of 480 months, 33% of the respondents were fully consistent with the orthodox model,
10% were consistent with prospect theory, and 2% were consistent with the Markowitz predictions, irrespec-
tive of whether or not plus and minus 480 months takes us far from the origin in Fig. 1. With an outcome
magnitude of 180 months, 30% were consistent with the orthodox model and 12% were consistent with
prospect theory. If plus and minus 180 months does not take us far from the origin in Fig. 1, 0% of these
respondents were consistent with Markowitz; if this number of months takes us far from the origin, 2% of the
respondents were consistent with Markowitz. With an outcome magnitude of 36 months, 15% were consistent
with the orthodox model and 33% were consistent with prospect theory. If plus and minus 36 months does not
take us far from the origin in Fig. 1, 5% of these respondents were consistent with Markowitz; if this number
of months takes us far from the origin, 3% of the respondents were consistent with Markowitz.
Table 6 Health care results: Pairwise choice
N SS SA AS AA SA vs AS
q.1 & 2 (±480mths, 0.9) 60 7% 23% 20% 50% Not significant
q.3 & 4 (±480mths, 0.7) 60 10% 17% 18% 55% Not significant
q.5 & 6 (±480mths, 0.5) 60 12% 8% 8% 72% Not significant
q.7 & 8 (±480mths, 0.3) 60 3% 12% 28% 57% p < 0.05
q.9 & 10 (±480mths, 0.1) 60 7% 40% 23% 30% Not significant
q.11 & 12 (±180mths, 0.9) 60 12% 17% 25% 47% Not significant
q.13 & 14 (±180mths, 0.7) 60 5% 17% 23% 55% Not significant
q.15 & 16 (±180mths, 0.5) 60 15% 7% 10% 68% Not significant
q.17 & 18 (±180mths, 0.3) 60 8% 7% 27% 58% p < 0.01
q.19 & 20 (±180mths, 0.1) 60 8% 18% 27% 47% Not significant
q.21 & 22 (±36mths, 0.9) 60 15% 17% 40% 28% p < 0.02
q.23 & 24 (±36mths, 0.7) 60 12% 8% 37% 43% p < 0.002
q.25 & 26 (±36mths, 0.5) 60 17% 7% 3% 73% Not significant
q.27 & 28 (±36mths, 0.3) 60 7% 12% 23% 58% Not significant
q.29 & 30 (±36mths, 0.1) 60 7% 47% 18% 28% p < 0.01
SS denotes risk seeking in the domains of both gains and losses; SA denotes risk seeking over gains but risk
aversion over losses; AS denotes risk aversion over gains but risk seeking over losses; and AA denotes risk
aversion over both gains and losses
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The other notable finding in these results is the increase in the number of
respondents who demonstrated universal risk aversion over gains and losses. Part
of the reason for this may have been that some respondents, whose answers
suggested risk neutrality in the valuation tasks, were forced into making a
choice. Nonetheless, with the exception of the highest and lowest probabilities
associated with 36 months of life and the lowest probability associated with
480 months of life, AA is the modal pattern throughout Table 6, a risk prefer-
ence pattern that was rarely observed in the studies reported earlier. Thus, at least
on the basis of this study, pairwise choice over health outcomes defined by
longevity is more likely than open valuation to secure risk attitudes that are
consistent with the predictions of the orthodox model of rational choice.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Prospect theory is the most influential descriptive alternative to the orthodox theory of
rational choice under risk and uncertainty, and its principal postulates are important in
the growing field of behavioural public policy. Nonetheless, existing evidence of the
most distinctive implication of prospect theory—the full fourfold pattern of risk
attitudes known as the reflection effect—is quite scarce and mixed. This article
represents an attempt to contribute to this evidence base, over money outcomes and,
for the first time, over health outcomes defined by longevity, through the use of abstract
but quasi-realistic decision contexts. With valuation questions, the results suggest
qualified support for the reflection effect over money outcomes and strong support
over the health outcomes used. Prospect theory generally outperformed both the
orthodox theory of rational choice and the Markowitz model in the valuation exercises.
In line with Harbaugh et al.’s (2009) money outcome results, however, in a within-
respondent test of the effect of valuation versus pairwise choice between risky treat-
ments defined by longevity and their expected values, the pairwise choice tasks were
found to substantially reduce observations of the reflection effect over life years, with
the effect remaining significant only for treatments that offered short additional dura-
tions of life and with the orthodox model performing much better than it had in the
valuation tasks.17,18
17 It may be contended that prospect theory was, strictly speaking, developed as a theory of pairwise choice
and was not meant to apply to open valuation or pricing tasks. Restricting the theory to pairwise choice would
limit its applicability to public policy, and thus the contention here is that it is better to think of it as a general
theory, as is often the case. However, if the theory is restricted to pairwise choice, it is noteworthy that the
results reported in this article, and those reported by Harbaugh et al. (2009), suggest that it is of limited use, if
evidence of the full fourfold reflection effect is an indication of its usefulness, although the results reported by
Bouchouicha and Vieder (2017), who used sequences of pairwise choices to elicit certainty equivalents, offer a
counter view. That the reflection effect was very much more present in the valuation exercises both in the
studies reported here and in Harbaugh et al. (2009) suggests that the prospect theory predictions may be better
realised over decision tasks for which the theory was not, strictly speaking, originally developed.
18 Binmore (1999) contended that on the basis of experiments that he had conducted, orthodox economic
theory can only be expected to predict decision making in the laboratory when the decision tasks are easy for
respondents to understand, when incentives are adequate and when there is sufficient time allowed for trial-
and-error adjustment. The results reported in this article suggest that an additional criterion is that the decision
tasks are pairwise choices rather than valuations.
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There were two big shifts in risk preference patterns that explain the differences
observed between the valuation and pairwise choice tasks. The first of these was that in
the pairwise choice tasks the respondents were more likely to be risk averse when faced
with low probability gambles over gains. This can perhaps be explained by an
anchoring process distorting respondents’ preferences in the valuation tasks. In the
classic preference reversal literature, for which there is evidence over money and
health, people tend to choose lotteries with a large probability of a modest outcome
over those with a modest probability of a large outcome but value the latter lotteries
higher (e.g. Oliver 2006, 2013; Seidl 2002). The most respected explanation for this
phenomenon is that respondents use different heuristics across preference elicitation
modes. That is, choice tasks might be more likely to focus attention on all that the
lottery offers, while valuation tasks may tend to focus attention on the outcomes. That
people may focus on the outcomes in the valuation tasks is known as scale compati-
bility. That is, respondents may be drawn to the money outcomes when asked for
money valuations, or longevity when asked to give a life year certainty equivalent for a
risky treatment. Moreover, respondents may anchor on the lottery’s best outcome in a
valuation task, and fail to adjust the overall value of the lottery downwards sufficiently
to take account of its other attributes (Bateman et al. 2007). If people overvalued the
health care treatments that offered low probability gains in the valuation tasks reported
in this article, this would explain why they appeared to be relatively more risk averse in
the pairwise choice questions.
The other substantial movement in the risk preference patterns was that in the
pairwise choice tasks the respondents were more likely to be risk averse when faced
with gambles over losses, irrespective of probability size. An explanation for this
finding is that in the valuation questions, the respondents were asked for the number
of months they would be willing to forgo in order to avoid the risky treatment, which
might have triggered a heavy dose of loss aversion. If so, and if the pairwise choice
questions led to a more considered view of all that the question entails, then this would
explain why the pairwise choice tasks tempered the respondents’ answers so that they
were more in line with the predictions of the orthodox theory of rational choice.
Possibly the most worrying implication of the results of the valuation questions is that
most people, much of the time and in relation to both money and health-related
outcomes, appear to be risk seeking in the face of losses, particularly moderate to large
probability losses, as prospect theory predicts. If people continually accept risk when
faced with losses, they are likely to find themselves in ever deeper trouble. There is real
world evidence, at least in relation to money, of this phenomenon; Fiegenbaum and
Thomas (1988), for example, found that firms are risk seeking when they are suffering
losses, and Wehrung (1989) reported that oil executives are substantially more risk
seeking than risk averse when faced with pure losses. Moreover, if we take as given the
argument that valuation questions can systematically distort preferences, then there is an
argument that methods, used in health care and elsewhere, that rely on such processes,
such as open willingness to pay exercises, ought to be used with caution (see also
Kahneman and Sugden 2005). However, this is not to conclude that direct choice-based
methods offer a panacea; for instance, it is well known that people’s perception of the
benefit that any particular good offers them will often be influenced by the available
alternatives (e.g. Parducci and Weddell 1986), suggesting that in elicitation exercises,
whether value or choice-based, preferences are often anything but fixed and stable.
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That said, if the results presented in this article for health-related outcomes and those
reported by Harbaugh et al. (2009) over money outcomes were ultimately to prove
generalisable, then for pairwise choice tasks prospect theory might have insubstantial
predictive power in relation to risk attitudes, at least over moderate to large outcomes.
Orthodox rational choice theory may then offer reasonable predictions, whereas open
valuation tasks might generally provoke responses that are much more consistent with
the predictions of prospect theory. This would leave us open to the possibility that
different ways of eliciting preferences in real world scenarios, and different magnitudes
of outcomes, may generate responses that are predominantly consistent with different
models of choice. These are issues that require further investigation.
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